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Social information use is a pivotal characteristic of the human species. Avoiding the cost of
individual exploration, social learning confers substantial ﬁtness beneﬁts under a wide variety
of environmental conditions, especially when the process is governed by biases toward
relative superiority (e.g., experts, the majority). Here, we examine the development of social
information use in children aged 4–14 years (n= 605) across seven societies in a standar-
dised social learning task. We measured two key aspects of social information use: general
reliance on social information and majority preference. We show that the extent to which
children rely on social information depends on children’s cultural background. The extent of
children’s majority preference also varies cross-culturally, but in contrast to social informa-
tion use, the ontogeny of majority preference follows a U-shaped trajectory across all
societies. Our results demonstrate both cultural continuity and diversity in the realm of
human social learning.
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Social information use is a crucial factor in the biologicalsuccess of the human species1. The ability to capitalise oninformation obtained by others equips humans with a
means to circumvent threats inherent to trial-and-error learning2.
Moreover, humans excel in successively implementing socially-
learned behaviours—also known as cumulative culture3 or the
ratchet effect4—a process which leads, in the course of evolution,
to increasingly adaptive solutions to environmental challenges3.
Individual exploration is costly compared to social learning:
while the former requires time and effort dedicated to trial and
error, the latter beneﬁts from the investments of the social model.
Moreover, individual exploration comes with comparably
high risks, e.g., attempting new strategies or uncovering new
grounds is relatively prone to injuries and/or conﬂict. Hence,
under such circumstances, social information use can be a ﬁtness-
increasing strategy2. Its expected payoff, however, depends on the
way social learning is applied. If random conspeciﬁcs are chosen
as models to learn from, social learning is unproductive. If skilful
experts are copied, on the other hand, social learning becomes
highly adaptive5. The challenge for the social learner lies in
optimally identifying social models, especially given that quality is
not always readily observable. For this reason, proxies of quality,
like the majority vote5–7 or social status8, can be relevant heur-
istics. In particular, the strategy to side with the majority has
received special attention because of its pervasive presence in
numerous forms of human interaction9,10, and its direct relevance
for understanding patterns of cultural evolution, given its
potential to increase within-group homogeneity and between-
group heterogeneity2,7.
Research with children in Western, industrialised societies
has revealed potent social information use in general and
majority preference in particular at an early age. For example,
14-month-old children already use social information ration-
ally11. Children at 4 years of age even ﬂexibly choose when to
imitate others or innovate novel solutions12, the kind of
advanced social information use precipitating adaptive learning
and cumulative culture13. Selective sensitivity to the majority
was reported for 2-year-old German children in a simple
decision-making task similar to the one used in the current
study14. Children watched four familiar, same age, same gender
peers demonstrating the use of an unknown machine. Three
peers demonstrated variant A once each, one peer demon-
strated variant B three times. Two-year-old German children in
this study preferentially copied the majority strategy14. Fur-
thermore, underscoring the fundamental and adaptive nature of
this learning bias, chimpanzees in the same study design also
preferentially copied the majority14. In another study, 3–6-
year-old American (United States) children were required to
copy a necklace-making demonstration from video. Children
showed greater imitative ﬁdelity after watching two identical
demonstrations by two different adults than after watching the
same individual twice15. The developmental trajectory of these
social learning phenomena, however, is less clear, since studies
typically focus on a limited age-range. Notable exceptions are
ﬁndings on increased over-imitation—i.e., copying both task-
relevant and task-irrelevant aspects of a social demonstration—
in 5–6-year-old children compared to 3–4-year-old children in
the United Kingdom16, and above-chance selectivity in social
learning strategies in 3-year olds developing into adaptive
reliance on majority information in 7-year olds in the United
States17. These studies, however, beg the question of whether
the obtained results represent human universals or behavioural
trends speciﬁc to Western, educated, industrialised, rich and
democratic (i.e., WEIRD) societies18.
Cross-cultural studies on children’s social information use,
including non-WEIRD societies, are scarce, and, to our
knowledge, have not compared ontogenetic trends across societies
and are usually limited to single comparisons between two
societies. Provisionally, these studies indicate that culture-speciﬁc
parenting styles yield cultural differences in children’s engage-
ment in social learning situations and their proclivity to learn
socially in general19–21. For instance, children raised in traditional
Mayan family contexts, with explicit focus on registering ongoing
social events, were found to pay attention to unaddressed social
interactions (i.e., third-party attention) more markedly than
European-American children19. On the other hand, in a practical
task eliciting social learning, the preference to imitate in a con-
ventional ('everyone always does it like this') rather than instru-
mental ('I am going to make a necklace') context was shared by
two starkly different societies20. For children’s tendency to over-
imitate, both cultural continuity22 and diversity23 have been
reported.
Here, we set out to study human social learning across a range
of cultures and ages. Our main goal was to elucidate, for the ﬁrst
time, whether reliance on social information develops in cross-
culturally similar or variable patterns. Only by means of a cross-
cultural comparison of developmental trajectories across a sig-
niﬁcant age span will we be able to identify patterns relevant to
distinguishing universal from culture-speciﬁc socialisation
processes21,24,25.
We administered a variant of a validated social learning task14
to children in societies spanning four continents, leading to a ﬁnal
sample of n= 605 children from 4 to 14 years old. Children were
shown a video in which four German children demonstrated how
to use a 'choice-box'14, which consisted of three differently
coloured pipes and an automatic toy dispenser. Three demon-
strators used one particular pipe, each throwing in one ball and
receiving one toy per insertion, sequentially. One additional
demonstrator used one of the two other pipes three times in a
row, also receiving one toy per insertion. The majority (the three
peers) and minority (the single peer) demonstrations were
counterbalanced for order and across the three pipes. Subse-
quently, the child received one ball to use on the 'choice-box',
after which we scored whether the child followed the majority, the
minority, or used the third, non-demonstrated option (hence-
forth: 'innovation').
We report that while we ﬁnd cross-cultural variation in both
children’s reliance on social information and majority preference,
only the ontogenetic trajectory of majority preference recurs
across cultural contexts: The youngest and oldest children in our
sample followed the majority most reliably across all societies.
This cross-culturally recurrent developmental U-shape may
reﬂect children’s changing capacities and motivations with
respect to perceiving the majority as a valuable source of infor-
mation, and as a potent force in shaping social relationships.
Results
The ontogeny of social information reliance across cultures.
Across cultures, we found that children’s reliance on social
information (vs. innovation) slightly decreased with age (like-
lihood ratio test (LRT) age: χ2= 3.99, df= 1, n= 605, p= 0.042,
estimate ± SD=−0.22 ± 0.11; Fig. 1a). However, the ontogenetic
trajectory of social information reliance varied substantially
across cultures (LRT culture/age interaction: χ2= 16.7, df= 6,
p= 0.010, Fig. 2a and Supplementary Fig. 1). The nature of
this age-effect difference was linear, not non-monotonous (LRT
culture/age2: χ2= 4.40, df= 6, p= 0.622). Across cultures, boys
were 1.41 times more likely to rely on social information than
girls were (LRT main effect sex: χ2= 2.9, df= 1, p= 0.088). The
order of demonstrations (majority and minority) did not sig-
niﬁcantly affect children’s inclination to use social information
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Social information use across culturesa
Fig. 2 Culture-speciﬁc ontogenies of children’s social learning. Depicted are a children’s reliance on social information (vs. innovation), and b majority (vs.
minority) preference, for each sampled culture. In a, n= 605, cultural diversity in social information use is represented by the differently valenced slopes
across age (the slopes of Brazil and the Central African Republic in panel a almost perfectly overlap, see Supplementary Figure 1). In b, n= 475, cultural







































Social information use across cultures
Fig. 1 The ontogeny of social learning in human children. Depicted are a children’s reliance on social information (vs. innovation), and b majority (vs.
minority) preference, across cultures. Blue lines represent ontogenetic trajectories across cultures; shaded area around the blue lines represent 95%
conﬁdence intervals. Medians are represented by the bold, horizontal lines within the boxes. The boxes represent the interquartile range (IQR), the vertical
lines attached to the boxes represent Q1–1.5 IQR (lower) and Q3+ 1.5 IQR (upper). Dot size in a is proportional to the number of observations in ratio 1:5,
with minimum and maximum number of observations per dot being 1 and 33, respectively. Dot size in b is proportional to the number of observations in
ratio 1:5, with minimum and maximum number of observations per dot being 1 and 24, respectively
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over innovating (LRT main effect order: χ2= 1.70, df= 1, p=
0.192).
The ontogeny of majority preference across cultures. Across
cultures, the ontogenetic trajectory of the majority (vs. minor-
ity) preference showed a U-shaped pattern with both the rela-
tively young and old children following the majority most
markedly (LRT age2: χ2= 4.38, df= 1, n= 475, p= 0.036;
Fig. 1b). Comparing cultures, there was no evidence for cross-
cultural heterogeneity in the U-shaped ontogenetic pattern for the
majority preference (LRT culture/age2 interaction: χ2= 3.98, df
= 6, p= 0.679; Fig. 2b and Supplementary Fig. 2). Collapsed over
ontogeny, societies did not differ in their proclivities to follow the
majority (χ2= 6.92, df= 6, p= 0.329). Again, boys tended to
follow the majority more than girls did (χ2= 3.30, df= 1, p=
0.082), with the odds for boys being 1.42 times larger than for
girls. When the majority was demonstrated to the subjects ﬁrst
(and thus the minority second), the odds for children to follow
the majority were 4.55 times larger than when the majority was
demonstrated second (χ2= 58.72, df= 1, p < 0.001). This pattern
is suggestive of a primacy effect26. Regardless, by testing all
variables in the same model, this effect was controlled for when
gauging the impact of culture and age on majority preference.
Discussion
Although the social demonstrations conferred adaptive infor-
mation to the children, i.e., obtaining the reward is contingent on
entering the ball into a (speciﬁc) hole of the apparatus, they did
not become more reliant on social information with increasing
age in all societies. Indeed, reliance on social information even
tended to decrease with age in some societies, most pronouncedly
in Germany and Indonesia. Such cultural differences spawn new
lines of investigation into the dynamics of human social learning.
For instance, future research with a selected set of contrasting
cultures might examine whether a relatively high socio-economic
standard (Germany and Indonesia (Jakarta) in our sample) might
buffer individuals against potential costs incurred by individual
exploration2 and consequently induce innovation. In summary,
the present ﬁnding supports the notion that the tendency to rely
on social information is not an ingrained mechanism in the
developing human mind, but is malleable to cross-culturally
variable circumstance27.
Children who readily relied on social information tended to
prefer the majority mostly at a relatively young and old age,
resulting in a U-shaped developmental trajectory. The U-shaped
developmental curve is a recurrent phenomenon in develop-
mental psychology28. Its emergence is typically explained by
incremental learning becoming more complex (due to a
demanding interplay between developing capacities), before it
becomes more efﬁcient. For instance, the ability to recognise
gesture-referent contingencies in toddlers seems to decline ﬁrst
between 18–24 months of age, after which it reinstates at (latest
at) the age of 4 years. This pattern has been explained in terms of
an increasing appreciation of communicative conventions: early
ﬂexible use of arbitrary label-forms is followed by relative rigidity
regarding object labels, after which children begin to understand
the symbolic representation of language 'beyond the initial phase
of using individual symbols to represent ideas in a one-to-one
fashion'29. The cross-culturally recurrent U-shaped development
of the majority bias is a new ﬁnding that speaks to the universal
affordances of crowds2,7,17. Here, we envision the U-shape to
emerge through a rudimentary majority bias early in develop-
ment14, followed by increasing complexity of often-opposing
social learning biases causing noise in decision-making, after
which children begin to understand the contingency between
proxy (i.e., the majority) and associated beneﬁts, which enables
more rational deliberation taking into account individuals’ aim to
make correct decisions (i.e., informational conformity) or avoid
social repercussions for being different (i.e., social conformity). In
line with this conjecture, a recent study indicated that the
majority bias guides decision-making differently in 3–4-year-old
vs. 7-year-old American (United States) children, with the older
children seemingly better able to understand relative majorities as
useful proxies for high-quality information than their younger
counterparts17. Additionally, changing social motivations could
result in a variable tendency to follow the majority across onto-
geny: Initial spontaneous, non-rational intuitions to follow the
majority30 are succeeded by a phase of egocentrism resulting in
relative indifference towards the majority, followed by deliberate,
strategic majority choice17, based on the growing realisation of
the social consequences of deviating. Similar ontogenetic patterns
have previously been shown for prosocial tendencies31.
Lastly, the sex differences trend in social information use,
especially with respect to the majority preference: Our ﬁnding
that boys tended to follow the majority more markedly than girls
did contrasts with existing literature on conformity sensu the
Asch studies32. Within this seminal conformity framework,
females (both juveniles and adults) are found to acquiesce to the
majority more than males30,33, which has been linked to lower
levels of self-reported conﬁdence in one’s own judgement34. Note,
however, the distinction between conforming against better
knowledge and conforming in order to obtain a new behavioural
variant. While the former is associated with social pressure and
with the aforementioned sex bias, the latter does not require the
forfeiting of an established notion or preference and is, as such,
more relevantly linked to (adaptive) decision-making17,35.
Importantly, the latter conformity type has, to our knowledge, not
been investigated with a focus on sex differences. Hence, our
study provides a ﬁrst indication that boys are more biased
towards following the majority in adopting novel behaviours than
girls are.
Our ﬁndings uniquely evidence both the cultural malleability
and cross-culturally recurrent features of the developing human
mind. As explanation for ﬁnding both cultural variation and
continuity in the realm of human social learning, we suggest that
the extent to which social information is relied upon might be
strongly inﬂuenced by society-speciﬁc affordances, while the
speciﬁc bias to prefer the majority might emerge from more
generic principles of homophily36 and optimal decision-
making2,7,14. For instance, societies could differ in the extent to
which potential costs of individual exploration (e.g., in terms of
time and effort)2 can be buffered (e.g., by social security), which
would affect reliance on social information, but not the relative
superiority (in terms of informational value) of the majority over
the minority. The systematic titration of the impact of societies’
characteristics on social information use is an exciting avenue for
future research and could provide important insights into the
socio-ecological correlates of the emergence of human culture.
An alternative explanation of our ﬁndings could be sought in
differential responding to Caucasian model demonstrations by
children from different cultural backgrounds. Caucasian children
are frequently attributed with high status among peers across
societies37. However, the cultural variability in social information
use (Fig. 1a) is not consistent with such an ethnic bias, as not only
German children showed a decreasing developmental trend in
social information use, but also children from non-Caucasian
societies (most pronouncedly in Indonesia, but also in Kenya and
Namibia). Moreover, the U-shaped developmental pattern with
respect to the majority bias (Fig. 1b) is robust across societies and
cannot be explained by an ethnic bias for both the majority and
minority consisted of Caucasian children.
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-04468-2
4 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 9:2076 | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-04468-2 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
Note that within the developmental U-shaped pattern with
respect to the majority bias, cultural variation could be identiﬁed
by comparing preferences within age categories. For instance, the
4–6-year olds from Indonesia, Kenya and Zambia seem sub-
stantially less inclined to follow the majority than their counter-
parts from Brazil, the Central African Republic, Germany and
Namibia (Fig. 2b). This cross-sectional detail corroborates the
necessity to study ‘the social learning of social learning strate-
gies’38,39. Indeed, our broader ﬁnding, revealing the culture-
general notion of the U-shaped majority preference, highlights
the importance of assessing ontogenetic trajectories for charting
cultural variation.
In comparison to other animal species, humans show extra-
ordinary variability across societies1,2. We propose that in order
to apprehend human uniqueness, we need to understand the
dynamic interplay between human ontogeny and the emergence
of culture. An encompassing theory of the human mind must
therefore consider the ways in which human psychology adapts
to, and shapes, social and ecological contexts, as well as the
universal foundations that enable this reciprocal interaction.
Methods
Sampling procedure and data handling. Nine societies were opportunistically
sampled as part of a larger research endeavour of the Comparative Cognitive
Anthropology research group of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology (Leipzig, Germany) and the Max Planck Institute for Psycho-
linguistics (Nijmegen, the Netherlands) led by DBMH (2009–2013). At the
respective research sites, subjects were opportunistically recruited (i.e., all available
parents and respective children were approached for participation in the experi-
ment), leading to a slightly unbalanced study sample (Supplementary Tables 1 and
2). At each ﬁeld site, informed consent forms (in the local language) signed by the
children’s parents, parental representatives, local authorities, community elders
and/or teachers were obtained prior to testing the children. All study procedures
were approved by the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology,
Leipzig, Germany.
When conditions permitted, sessions were video-recorded for later scrutiny. All
video-recorded sessions (80% of all sessions) were checked for (i) procedural
adequacy, and (ii) corroboration of live-scored responses by two independent
coders. Digression from the outlined procedure was judged in light of the a priori
formulated inclusion criteria (Supplementary Table 3). Corroboration of the live-
scored responses was optimal (100%).
Participants. We tested 681 children (341 boys, 340 girls, age range 4–14 years)
across nine societies based on availability at the respective ﬁeld sites (Supple-
mentary Notes 1). Prior to analysis, we formulated and applied inclusion criteria
(Supplementary Table 3) after which we obtained a sample including 657 children
(331 boys, 326 girls, age range 4–14 years). For reasons of suspected commu-
nication between participants during the experiment, we excluded all children from
Pangkalan Bun (28 children, age range: 6–7 years) from the analyses (see Sup-
plementary Notes 2 for the script used to detect out-of-scale correlation between
successive responses). We furthermore excluded all children from Samoa (24
children, age range: 5–8 years) due to the impossibility of obtaining reliable model
estimates (see Supplementary Notes 2 and Supplementary Fig. 3 for the model
stability results). Excluding Samoa did not qualitatively change the results (see
Supplementary Notes). The ﬁnal sample comprised 605 children (306 boys, 299
girls, age range: 4–14 years, mean age ± SD: 8.11 ± 2.50 years) from seven different
societies [Brazil, Central African Republic (BaAka), Germany, Indonesia, Namibia
(≠Akhoe Hai//om), Kenya (Samburu) and Zambia (Bemba)]. We refrained from
applying subjective cutoffs with respect to the number of participants per age or
culture. Generalised linear models are robust against unbalanced designs if model
stability measures are taken into account.
Design. We used a one-shot design to maximise data independency. Instructions
to the children were standardised and given in the local language by trained
experimenters. The demonstrations were counterbalanced in terms of order of
a
b
Fig. 3 Experimental set-up. Illustration of the apparatus, including the a majority and b minority demonstrations. Upon dropping the ball into the pipe, a
reward was automatically released from the apparatus
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majority and minority demonstrations, and in terms of which coloured pipes were
used by the demonstrators.
Experimental procedure. Children, who were naive with respect to the task, were
called into a classroom one after another to partake in the experiment. Nothing at
this stage was revealed about the aim of the experiment itself. Children received the
following instructions in their local language: 'I have brought a box that has three
openings. If one throws a ball in the correct hole, a toy is delivered from the box. I
show you a movie now in which four different children will show you how to use it.
Thereafter, you can use it yourself. Watch closely!'. Children then watched the
video demonstrations individually. The video depicted four peers demonstrating
how to use the box (Fig. 3). The demonstrators were the same gender as the
observer. The video demonstrations during the experiment were non-verbal, yet a
supporting narration in the child’s local language was presented by the experi-
menter in sequence according to counterbalance condition: Minority: 'This is [x=
pre-determined locally appropriate name], (s)he uses the yellow hole. This is [x]
again, (s)he uses the yellow hole again. This is again [x], (s)he uses the yellow hole
again' (i.e., three times same demonstrator, same hole).
Majority: 'This is [y= different pre-determined locally appropriate name], (s)he
uses the blue hole. This is [z= different pre-determined locally appropriate name],
(s)he uses the blue hole. This is [a= different pre-determined locally appropriate
name], (s)he uses the blue hole'. After the video demonstration, children received a
ﬁnal instruction in their local language: 'Now you can use the box. Beware; you
only have this one ball'. The 'choice-box' contained three differently coloured pipes.
If a ball was dropped in any one of the pipes, a reward was automatically released
from the box. After the child had used the 'choice-box' and received the reward, he/
she was thanked and escorted to another room (or outside) in order to minimise
the chance for them to communicate with the remaining naive children.
Statistical methods. We tested children’s reliance on social information (vs.
innovation), and children’s preference for the majority (vs. the minority). Both
tests were statistically approached using generalised linear models with binomial
error structure and logit link function39, and ﬁtted with the function 'glm' in R
(version 3.4.1)40. First, we established the signiﬁcance of our full model41 (com-
prising 'culture', 'age', 'sex', and, to allow for ﬂuctuating age trends and cultural
variation, the polynomial 'age squared' and the interactions of culture with the age
variables, respectively) by comparing it to our null model (comprising only 'order
of demonstrations') with a likelihood ratio test42 (R function 'anova': χ2= 35.6, df
= 21, p= 0.024). Second, we assessed parameter contribution to explaining var-
iation in the dependent variable [(i) social information use vs. innovation, and (ii)
majority vs. minority preference) by comparing full with respective reduced (i.e.,
only lacking the variable under scrutiny) models using likelihood ratio tests42,43.
The variable 'age' was z-transformed to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
Speciﬁcally, in our ﬁrst model (n= 605), the outcome variable was 'yes/no followed
demonstrations', with '1' indicating the majority or minority response, and '0' the
third, non-demonstrated option. In our second model, we selected only those
children that followed one of the social demonstrations (response '1' in the ﬁrst
model; n= 475), and tested whether the majority was favoured over the minority
by having our outcome variable being 'yes/no followed the majority', with '1'
indicating the majority response, and '0' indicating the minority response. Odds
ratios for signiﬁcant dichotomous parameters were obtained by exponentiation of
the respective model estimates44. Children’s responses were only used if children’s
comprehension of the task was judged as valid by the experimenter onsite as well as
two independent video-coders (Supplementary Table 3).
Data availability. The data were collected based on availability of subjects at the
ﬁeld sites. No selection criteria were applied in recruiting subjects other than age
and local residence. The data sets generated and analysed during the current study
are available in the Open Science Framework repository (https://osf.io/m3ub7).
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